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NOTICE OF BREACH IN SALES AND STRICT TORT
LIABILITY LAW: SHOULD THERE BE A DIFFERENCE?
JERRY J. PHILLIPSt
The theoretical differences between the law of sales and that of
strict liability in tort are well known. Most noteworthy are variations
in the doctrines of privity, disclaimer, limitation of remedies and notice
of breach. Generally, privity is not required, disclaimers and limitations
of remedies are ineffective and notice of breach is dispensed with in
strict tort liability.1 In sales law, on the other hand, privity of contract
may be required, properly drawn disclaimers and limitations of remedies
may be effective and timely notice of breach may be a condition to
recovery.2 In addition, a different statute of limitations may apply, and
the scope of recovery by non-purchasing third parties may differ depend-
ing upon which body of law is being applied.'
Close similarities between these two areas of the law are also well
established. Most notably, proof of negligence is not a prerequisite, and
contributory negligence is generally not a bar to recovery under either
theory.' These strikingly similar characteristics, seen against the back-
drop of their inexplicable differences, strongly suggest that these two
theories should be merged so that the right of nonpurchasing third parties
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, comment in to § 402A (1965) provides:
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the
Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to
warranties; and it is not affected by limitations on the scope and content
of warranties, or by limitation to "buyer" and "seller" in those statutes. Nor
is the consumer required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a
reasonable time after it occurs, as is provided by the Uniform Act.
2. See L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LiAmrLITY §§ 16.04[3][a], 19.07
[1]-[2], 19.05 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FRUmER & FRIEDMAN].
3. Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594 (1970),
presents a good statement of the policy reasons for applying different statutes of
limitations to sales and strict tort claims. Cf. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969), applying the warranty
statute of limitations to a claim based on a theory of strict liability in tort. See
generally'FRumER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 16A[5] [g]. For a discussion of the
scope of third-party recovery in strict tort and sales law, see Noel, Defective Products:
Extc nsion of Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38 TENN. L. Rlv. 1 (1970).
4. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, comment in to § 402A (1965), recognizes
the theoretical similarity between sales and strict tort law in that proof of negligence
is not required under either theory. Comment n states that contributory negligence
is not a bar to recovery in strict tort, and the same result has frequently been reached
in sales law. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 16.01 [3].
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to recover does not turn upon the vagaries of pleading.5 The thesis of this
article is that the requirement of notice of breach in sales law serves
beneficial policies. There is, therefore, no justifiable basis for dispensing
with the notice requirement as a matter of law merely because an action
is grounded upon a theory of tort liability rather than upon a theory
of warranty.
SALES LAW AS A VEHICLE FOR THE RECOVERY OF ECONoMIc Loss
Some courts have taken the approach that personal injury and pro-
perty damage claims are peculiarly suitable for analysis under the
strict liability doctrine, whereas economic loss should be treated under
article two of the Uniform Commercial Code.' This line of demarcation,
although superficially attractive, presents many complications. Not only
is it often difficult to distinguish between property damage and economic
loss, but it is equally perplexing to find a satisfactory policy justifica-
tion for treating such types of damage differently." It is unclear, for
example, whether the concept of physical harm to property within the
meaning of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is intended
to be restricted to situations of immediate physical damage.' If the harm
must be immediate, then it is unclear why damage resulting from gradual
deterioration should be treated differently. The doctrine of strict liability
in tort, on the other hand, has not been limited to physical harm to
person or property but has been extended in case of public misrepre-
5. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in
Defective-Products Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Franklin],
presents a thorough discussion of the problems inherent in maintaining separate
theories of recovery. These problems are particularly acute where common law theories
of strict tort conflict with statutory rules under the Code. See Dickerson, The ABC's
of Products Liability--With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L.
REv. 439, 453 (1969) :
Indeed, the whole trend beginning with [Greenman v.] Yuba [Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962)] and section 402A
makes beautiful sense if we assume that courts may treat statutes similarly
to cases. But how can we square such an assumption with the tripartite
system of separating legislative from judicial and executive powers that
has been adopted by every American constitution?
See also Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Corn-
inercial Code: A Conmmentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Com-
munications Barriers, 17 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shanker].
6. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965),
is the leading case espousing this view. See the discussion of the problem in Note,
Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 917 (1966).
7. The courts in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965), and Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970), rejected the Seely approach because they were unable to find a satisfactory basis
for distinguishing between economic and other types of loss.
8. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 683 (1967) ; Franklin, supra note 5, at 986-88.
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sentation to allow recovery for pecuniary loss as well.9 Apparently the
attributes of sales law-such as notice, disclaimer, limitation of remedies
and statute of limitations-are not intended to apply to such an action.1 0
The apparent difference between a strict liability action based upon
public misrepresentation and an action based upon breach of express
warranty under the Code is that in the first instance the misrepresenta-
tion is "public" while in the second it is "private." It is unclear why
this difference should result in the application of an entirely different
legal theory where, for example, there is a manufacturer's warranty
given for the benefit of an unknown purchaser or purchasers. Such a
warranty could be described as either public or private with equal
accuracy.
Subsumed under the proposition that sales warranty law and strict
liability have their own proper fields of applicability is the idea that
sales law more properly applies to the commercial relations between the
buyer and his immediate seller while an action in strict liability lies
against any seller in the chain of distribution." This distinction, however,
does not withstand analysis. If an action in strict liability should more
properly lie against a remote seller then, theoretically, such an action
is less suitable against an immediate seller. No such distinction, how-
ever, has been made by the courts. Indeed § 2-318 of the Code recognizes
the right of certain nonpurchasers to sue for breach of warranty while
the comments to that section and others express neutrality regarding
the common law expansion of warranty actions against remote sellers."
Whatever problems may inhere in dispensing with the privity require-
ment are in no way peculiar either to sales law or to strict tort liability.
9. Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966), is a leading
case allowing recovery against a remote manufacturer for loss of bargain and loss of
use arising from public misrepresentation by the manufacturer. The theory of the case
is based on RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552D (Council Draft No. 17, 1964).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS comment in to § 402A (1965), clearly indi-
cates that sales law restrictions regarding privity, limitation of remedies and notice of
breach are not intended to apply to actions under § 402A. Comment d to § 402B states
that the "difficulties attending the use of the word 'warranty' are the same as those in-
volved under § 402A, and comment in under that section is equally applicable here so far
as it is pertinent." Comment a to § 552D states:
This Section parallels § 402B, which states the rule as to strict liability for
physical harm to a user or consumer of the chattel, where the seller makes a
misrepresentation to the public regarding its character or quality. This Section
states the same rule, as to liability for pecuniary loss, caused to one who pur-
chases the chattel in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation. The Com-
ments under § 402B are applicable here, so far as they are pertinent.
11. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Newsome, - Tenn. - , 470 S.W.2d 348 (1971);
FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2 § 16.04[3] [a].
12. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2; § 2-318, Comment 3.
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Another rationale for separate theories of liability is that each
theory meets the need of a different type of plaintiff. It is argued that
article two of the Code is designed primarily for merchants and only
secondarily deals with problems peculiar to the nonmerchant consumer
or user.1" Strict liability, on the other hand, is basically concerned with
the nonmerchant consumer or user. This explanation, however, is unsatis-
factory since there is no discernible pattern for different treatment. The
Code treats the merchant dealer specially in many instances and re-
cognizes that different rules apply to the nonmerchant buyer and seller."
Moreover, there is no indication in the cases that recovery in strict
liability is permitted only if the aggrieved plaintiff is classified as a
nonmerchant user or consumer.
THE DICHOTOMY IN HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The more probable explanation for the differences between the
law of sales warranty and that of strict tort liability turns on the fact
that sales law is codified while the doctrine of strict tort liability has
basically evolved by the case law. The development of sales law has to a
large extent been frozen by codification, since courts in the exercise
of judicial restraint are reluctant to ignore the intent of the legislature.
Had sales law developed by common law decision rather than by codi-
fication, it is probable that the doctrine of strict tort liability would not
have developed separate rules which frequently conflict with those of
sales law.
Recognition of the historical reasons for the variations between strict
liability and sales law does not, however, justify an irrational perpetuation
of such differences. If the elimination of these distinctions requires
changes in the tort theory of recovery, the courts are free to make the
change. If the change should be made on the warranty side, it should
be made by the legislature-unless it can be done within the bounds of
reasonable statutory construction.
It is not persuasive to argue that sales and strict tort liability should
be maintained as separate bodies of law in the field of products liability
to give the plaintiff the benefit of that theory which is more useful to
him. Nor does it clarify matters to debate whether strict liability has
more characteristics of traditional tort law than of warranty law. A
person should not be able to accomplish by one means what for good
policy reasons is denied him by another means. Unless a sufficient policy
13. See text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
14. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104, Comment 2; § 2-607, Comments
4-5; §§ 2-316(3) (c), 2-719(3).
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reason can be found to justify the existence of separate means, that which
is founded on better policy should control.
Because of the close similarities between the two bodies of law,
this article is primarily concerned with a comparison of the law of notice
in sales and strict tort liability. However, the considerations applicable to
notice may apply as well to a products liability action in negligence. As
discussed below, there is reason for concluding that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has made notice of breach a condition to recovery of
damages resulting from the sale of defective goods regardless of the
theory on which the claim is based. Moreover, the policies for requiring
or excusing notice of breach in sales or strict liability in tort seem to
apply with equal force to a products liability action based on negligence.
On the other hand, with the complexity of issues that are involved
in any determination of timely notice, it is doubtful whether a court, as
a matter of law, should bar a claim on the ground of absence of such
notice except in the clearest circumstances. In addition, it is debatable
whether absence of timely notice should normally be found, as a matter
of law, to result in a directed verdict for the defendant where the
plaintiff is a layman. Notice, although it serves laudable policies, is
but one element in a products liability case. The probable absence of
notice may not be sufficiently important to control the outcome of a
case where there is any reasonable doubt of the plaintiff's justification
for delay or failure to notify.
SCOPE OF THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT
In sales law notice of breach is a condition to the assertion of any
remedy by the buyer against the seller.15 In strict liability, on the other
hand, there is a marked trend toward dispensing with the notice require-
ment, at least where personal injuries are involved. According to
Frumer and Friedman, the "better view" is that notice is not required
in a personal injury case.16 Prosser states that while the notice require-
ment is "a sound commercial rule," it "becomes a booby-trap for the
unwary" consumer who suffers personal injuries and seeks recovery
against a remote seller since such a claimant is seldom "steeped in the
business practice which justifies the rule."'"
Apparently notice of breach of a sales contract was not generally
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-602(1) (to reject) ; 2-608(2) (to revoke ac-
ceptance) ; 2-607(3) (a) (to assert any other remedy for breach).
16. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, .srpra note 2, § 19.05[1].
17. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 655 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PRossER].
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
required by the early common law.'" Moreover, the English Sale of
Goods Act contained no notice provision comparable to § 49 of the
Uniform Sales Act. This section is the predecessor of Code §
2-607(3) (a), which makes timely notice of breach a condition to the
assertion of any remedy by the buyer against the seller after the goods
have been accepted.'
As a general rule, notice of breach has not been required in tort
actions based on a theory of negligence.20 The Alabama Supreme Court
has suggested that the absence of this development may be due to the
fact that in a nonsales situation the alleged tortfeasor "or his servant
or each was a participant in the happening or occurrence" so that he
normally receives notice without any special action being taken by the
injured party.2' This is not usually the case in a sales situation, how-
ever, where the buyer and seller are separated when the damage occurs.
At least where a sale of goods is involved, the intent of the Uniform
Commercial Code may be to require timely notice of breach as a condition
to recovery regardless of the theory used by the buyer. Code §
2-607(3) (a) provides that failure to give such notice will bar the
buyer from "any remedy." In Nelson v. Boulay Brothers Co.,22 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court disallowed a warranty claim under the Uni-
form Sales Act because of lack of timely notice but permitted the
negligence claim to stand. It reserved decision, however, on the issue of
whether the same result would be reached under the "any-remedy"
bar of § 2-607(3) (a) of the Code, which was not in effect in Wisconsin
when the cause of action arose.
Although the scope of article two of the Code is restricted to the
sale of goods, it has been recognized that the notice provisions of that
article may be extended by analogy to nonsales situations where the
18. FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 19.05[1].
19. (3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or
should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach
or be barred from any remedy.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3) (a).
20. James, Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 192, 197 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as James]. There are exceptions to this rule, as for example where the action is
against a municipal corporation for injuries sustained as a result of some condition main-
tained by the municipality. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-1003 (1971) ; James, Tort
Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 610, 634 (1955).
Another example is illustrated by Coghlan v. White, 236 Mass. 165, 128 N.E. 33 (1920),
dealing with a peculiar Massachusetts statute requiring notice of injury to the occupant
of any premises on which the claimant is injured by a defective condition caused by
snow or ice.
21. Smith v. Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 103, 122 S.2d 591, 593 (1960).
22. 27 Wis. 2d 637, 135 N.W.2d 254 (1965).
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policy of the Code is deemed to apply. Thus, the notice requirement
was extended "as a matter of policy" to a claim for breach of a lease in
Boehck Construction Equipment Corp. v. H. Fuller & Sons, Inc.,2" and
in Caparelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc.2 a majority of the court apparently
assumed that notice was required in a claim for breach of warranty
regarding the habitability of a basement in a sale of realty. The notice
requirement of the Code has also been held to apply to a warranty of
performance accompanying a sale of goods. 5
Relaxation of the notice requirement in a sales context has not
always depended upon whether the claimant was suing on a theory of
negligence or strict liability, as opposed to a theory of warranty. Indeed,
one of the more confusing aspects of products liability law derives from
the fact that the courts have not clearly distinguished between the theories
of strict liability and warranty in determining the right of recovery.26
The reason for this confusion is that the two theories are historically
and conceptually intertwined. The Indiana Supreme Court, for example,
held that notice of breach was not required under § 49 of the Uniform
Sales Act where the buyer sought recovery for personal injuries." Since
§ 70 of the Uniform Sales Act provided that nothing in the Act was
intended to affect a buyer's right to recover special damages and since
a buyer was not required to give notice of breach for personal injuries
prior to passage of the Sales Act, the court reasoned that § 49, read
in connection with § 70, indicated a legislative intent to retain the
lack-of-notice rule as it existed prior to passage of the Act. Such a con-
struction of § 70, however, has been considered strained and not in
accord with the natural intent of the section,2" and it has not been
followed by other courts which have generally imposed the notice re-
quirement under the Sales Act regardless of the kind of damages
sought.
Similarly, the notice requirement of § 2-607(3) (a) of the Code
has been neglected in personal injury actions against a seller with whom
the claimant was not in privity on the ground that the provision was
23. 19 Wis. 2d 658, 121 N.W.2d 303 (1963).
24. 39 N.J. 585, 190 A.2d 369 (1963). Two justices were of the opinion that the
notice requirement of the Sales Act was inapplicable to a sale of realty.
25. Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 52 Del. 406, 158 A.2d 814 (1960).
See Note, The Application of Implied Warranties to Predominantly "Ser'vke" Transac-
tions, 31 OHio ST. L.J. 580 (1970). See also Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Qual-
ity it Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 653 (1957).
26. See Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970).
27. Wright-Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett, 235 Ind. 307, 133 N.E2d 713 (1956).
28. Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 122 N.W.2d 737 (1963).
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intended to apply only to relations between buyers and sellers who
have dealt with each other. For example, in Tomczuk v. Chesire9 the
court held that a § 2-318 third-party beneficiary was not required to
give notice because he was not a "buyer" within the meaning of §
2-607(3) (a), and in LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc.3" it was held
that a buyer was not required to give notice of breach to a remote
seller for the same reason.
Such reasoning, at least when applied to a § 2-318 third-party
beneficiary, is contrary to the intent of the drafters of the Code as ex-
pressed in the comments to § 2-607. Indeed, the comments state that
the notice requirement of § 2-607(3) (a) is intended to apply to a
claim by a third-party beneficiary under § 2-318.1 The intent of the
Code, however, is less clear with regard to the duty of a buyer to give
notice of breach in an action against a remote seller since the Code
nowhere expressly provides for such an action. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the notice requirement should apply in that
situation as well since the policy for requiring notice is applicable
regardless of privity. Moreover, it seems anomalous to require notice
on behalf of a nonpurchasing beneficiary under § 2-318 and to dispense
with the requirement in other situations where the seller and buyer are
not in privity.
It is clear that the notice requirement of § 2-607(3) (a) applies
whenever the parties are in privity, regardless of the nature of damages
being sought. Nevertheless, the comments to the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, §§ 402A, 402B and 552D, suggest that no notice is required
in strict liability regardless of both the nature of the injury and the
presence of privity."2 The overwhelming majority of cases that dispense
29. 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 217 A.2d 71 (Super. Ct. 1965).
30. 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957). Cf. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.,
Inc., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) ; Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore.
301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965) ; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
31. Under this Article various beneficiaries are given rights for injuries su-
stained by them because of the seller's breach of warranty. Such a beneficiary
does not fall within the reason of the present section in regard to discovery of
defects and the giving of notice within a reasonable time after acceptance, since
he has nothing to do with acceptance. However, the reason of this section does
extend to requiring the beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has oc-
curred.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607, Comment 5. The cross reference for comment 5 is
to § 2-318, which is the third-party-beneficiary section in article two.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, comment in to § 402A (1965), states that the
notice requirement is inapplicable to an action under that section; comment d to § 402B
states that comment in to § 402A is also applicable to § 402B; and comment a to § 552D
states that the comments to § 402B are applicable to §552D.
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with the notice requirement, however, are restricted to situations where
personal injuries are claimed.33 Here the courts adopting a strict liability
approach have decisively parted company with the Code by holding
that no notice is required where personal injuries are involved even
though the parties are in privity. In order better to evaluate this
departure, the purpose of notice must be examined.
THaE PURPOSES OF NOTICE
Professor Honnold suggests there is evidence to indicate the notice
requirement "grew out of suspicion that buyers were using stale and
unfounded claims of breach of warranty as a device to avoid (or scale
down) price recovery." 4 It seems equally likely that the requirement
arose as an extension of the notice requirement for rescission of con-
tract."5 Where the buyer intends to rescind, it is important that the
seller receive notice of the buyer's intention at the earliest possible
date in order to take action to minimize his damages.
The Uniform Commerical Code also imposes a duty upon the
rescinding buyer to give the seller notice of defect as soon as it is
reasonably discoverable. If the buyer has a right to reject the goods,
a primary purpose of such notice is to enable the seller to exercise any
33. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 19.05[l]. In Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), where the court allowed recovery
of economic loss by a buyer against a remote seller on a theory of strict tort liability, it
indicated that the notice requirement would not apply; but the effect of this holding is
undercut by the court's alternative finding that the remote seller was not prejudiced by
delayed notice because the defect was undisputed and by the finding that the claimant
gave timely notice to his immediate seller. Id. at 67-68, 207 A.2d at 313.
34. J. HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANC-
ING 218 (3d ed. 1968).
35. Some courts before adoption of the Uniform Sales Act held that the buyer's
acceptance of defective goods without protest cut off all his remedies against the seller,
while other courts held either that the effect of the acceptance turned on the buyer's in-
tent or that the buyer might still have a remedy for damages although he had lost the
remedy of rescission through acceptance; after adoption of the Sales Act, timely notice
of breach became a condition precedent to the effective assertion of any remedy for
breach of warranty. Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 39 N.J. 585, 190 A2d 369
(1963); 3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND
UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT § 484a (rev. ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
Cases under both the Sales Act and the Code treat untimely notice of rescission as hav-
ing the same effect as untimely notice of breach. See Ingle v. Marked Tree Equip. Co.,
244 Ark. 1166, 428 S.W2d 286 (1968) ; Hudspeth Motors, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 238 Ark.
410, 382 S.W.2d 191 (1964); Gilpin v Colt Co., 7 Tenn. App. 630 (1928). The Code
policies favoring cure and prompt disposal of the goods by the seller in a rescissiori
situation are not applicable where the buyer is only seeking damages, and therefore the
same promptness of notice would arguably not be needed in a claim for damages as in a.
claim for rescission. However, While comment 4 to Code § 2-607 recognizes that the
requirements as to content of notice are less rigorous where only damages are claimed,
it does not indicate that the requirements of timeliness are any less stringent.
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right of cure that he may have under § 2-508.11 Code § 2-605 specifically
implements this right by providing that the rejecting buyer must enumer-
ate the defects on which he is relying in order to enable the seller to
effect cure. 7 If the buyer is not reasonably able to discover a defect
until after he has accepted the goods, he may revoke his acceptance
provided he does so before the goods substantially change in condition
as the result of nondefect causes and provided he gives notice of defect
to the seller as soon as reasonably possible."8 Arguably, in a revocation
situation the Code does not confer a right of cure on the seller.93 Notice
in a revocation situation, therefore, does not serve the same purpose as
it does in the case of rejection-unless the seller reserves by contract a
right of cure after acceptance. In any event, the seller may need timely
notice of revocation of acceptance in order to minimize his damages by
disposing of the goods.4"
Whether the buyer is rejecting, revoking acceptance or claiming
damages for breach, the notice requirements of the Code also serve to
protect the seller's interest in inspecting the goods so that he may deter-
mine the nature of the alleged defect. Code § 2-515 supports this purpose
by providing that either party may inspect, test and sample goods in the
hands of the other in furtherance of the adjustment of any claim or
dispute.41
The importance of the seller's interest in inspection is graphically
illustrated by Owen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 2 In Owen the buyer
36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-508(1) permits the seller to cure upon rejec-
tion if the time for performance has not yet expired; § 2-508(2) permits him to cure
after the time for tender or delivery has expired if he had "reasonable grounds to be-
lieve" that the goods as tendered would be acceptable.
37. Where the rejecting buyer fails to state "a particular defect which is ascer-
tainable by reasonable inspection," such failure will preclude him from relying on that
defect either "to justify rejection or to establish breach" if it is shown that the seller
could have cured the defect had it been reasonably stated.
38. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-608(2).
39. See Phillips, Revocation of Acceptance and the Consumer Buyer, 1970 Com. L.J.
354, 357-58.
40. The duty to dispose of rejected goods rests on the seller except in the special
situations enumerated in § 2-603(1). See Campbell v. Pollock, 101 R.I. 223, 230-31,
221 A.2d 615, 618-19 (1966).
41. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-515, comment 2, states that this section is not
intended to conflict with the right of the seller or of the buyer to resell rejected goods
and that any apparent conflict "is to be resolved by requiring prompt action by the
parties." If the buyer intends to dispose of defective goods, it would seem that "prompt
action" would require him to notify the seller of breach prior to such sale in order to
preserve the seller's right of inspection under this section. Where he is reselling as a
rejecting or revoking buyer in order to realize his lien under § 2-711 (3), he must give
notice in accordance with the requirements of § 2-706(3)-(4).
42. 273 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1959).
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claimed damages for personal injuries which resulted from being burned
by a shirt which he purchased from the defendant. The shirt allegedly
caught fire because the cloth was defectively flammable. The buyer
waited approximately two years after the date of injury before bringing
suit and gave no notice of breach during the interim between the injury
and the filing of the action. The appellate court sustained the trial court's.
direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant on grounds that the claim
was barred by an unreasonable delay in giving notice. The defendant
argued successfully that if it had been advised shortly after the accident
of the kind of shirt involved, it could have identified the lot from which
the shirt came and "could have tested similar shirts in the lot for inflam-
mable characteristics. 43
The Owen case illustrates how the seller's interest in inspection
may extend beyond the actual goods involved in the dispute. The plain-
tiff's shirt was allegedly destroyed by the fire "except for the collar, and
that was afterwards disposed of."44 Nevertheless, the court found that
the seller had a legitimate interest in inspecting goods of the same lot
for purposes of ascertaining its liability or defense. It is inappropriate,
therefore, to conclude that the inspection purpose of the notice requirement
is necessarily rendered inapplicable merely because the goods are
destroyed.
An analogous problem is raised by Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co. 41 In Pritchard the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries
resulting from lung cancer allegedly contracted from smoking cigarettes
manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff did not give notice of the
injury for approximately ten months after he first became ill. The court
held that plaintiff's claim was not barred by such delay since there was
"no allegation or intimation that defendant has suffered any prejudice
by not receiving notice sooner or in a different and more comprehensive
form."
4
Timely inspection would have served no real purpose in ascertaining
whether the cigarettes were defective. The issue was whether a causal
relationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer existed, not
whether these two events had actually occurred. Whenever an issue of
defectiveness is thus abstractly posed, its resolution will turn on scientific
or expert data, as the court suggests, 47 and not upon inspection of the
43. Id. at 143.
44. Id.
45. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
46. Id. at 299.
47. Besides the fact that the plaintiff was "a layman inexperienced in the scientific
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particular goods or of a particular lot of goods.
Closely related to the inspection purpose is that of investigation.
Investigation is broader than inspection since it includes such activities
of the seller as talking to witnesses and examining its own files to deter-
mine if there is any record of a transaction. It is not as easy to dispose of
the investigation purpose of notice on grounds of lack of prejudice
because of the difficulty in determining by hindsight what a timely
investigation would have revealed.
This problem is illustrated by Columbia Axle Co. v. American
Automobile Insurance Co.4" The intermediate seller of an axle assembly
unit, through its insurer as subrogee, sued its seller for damages incurred
by an ultimate purchaser as the result of an alleged defect in the unit.
The court found that the plaintiff inexcusably failed to give the defendant
notice of the claimed breach until approximately six months after the
ultimate buyer had notified the plaintiff of his injury and of his intent
to claim damages. The court, therefore, held the plaintiff's notice to be
unreasonably late as a matter of law. The plaintiff offered to furnish
defendant with the names and addresses of witnesses in the buyer's suit
against it, together with the results of metallurgical tests conducted in
plaintiff's own laboratory. The court stated that while the results of such
investigations were important, such an offer of evidence did not eliminate
the prejudice that the defendant suffered as a result of the delayed notice.
In reaching this result the court apparently concluded that it is more
profitable to investigate new tracks than old ones and that there is
more assurance in investigating one's own tracks than someone else's.
Timely notice also serves the purpose of settlement. The Code and
the cases recognize the importance of notice for this purpose since an
early complaint may result in settlement of the dispute before it hardens
with the passage of time and the change of conditions. 9 In addition,
early notice may enable the seller to minimize his damages by negotiating
settlements with third parties and by suggesting ways to prevent further
damage."°
complications involved here," the court noted that these complications "took many
weeks of preparation and trial to unravel." Id. at 299.
48. 63 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1933).
49. The notification which saves the buyer's rights under this Article need only
be such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach,
and thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3) (a), Comment 4.
50. Texas Motorcoaches, Inc. v. A.C.F. Motors Co., 154 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1946);
L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 438 S.W.2d 717 (1969).
Settlement agreements are highly favored in the law and will be upheld when-
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Encouraging compromise is one of the most laudable goals of the
law. Indeed, much of the sales article of the Code is directed toward
furthering this goal.51 Compromise is not always an unmixed blessing,
however. Whenever parties are in an unequal position, as is frequently
the case when the claimant is a lay consumer and the seller is a merchant
or large manufacturer, the danger of imposition is always present.
Absent a fraudulent settlement, which can be set aside, "2 it may be
argued that there need be no concern over the possibility that a claimant
may obtain less by settlement than he might have obtained by litigation.
The difference in amount may well be eaten up by the expenses and delay
of litigation. Such an argument, however, assumes that fraudulent settle-
ments are readily identifiable and easily set aside. The opposite assump-
tion is probably more frequently correct.
Nevertheless, unless there is a substantial indication that the policy
served by the notice requirement is more harmful than useful in this
context, the presumption should lie in favor of its usefulness because of
the desirability of compromise as a general goal of the law. Even if it
were shown that there is a substantial problem of imposition through
settlement in products liability cases, the solution would not necessarily
be to dispense with the notice requirement since this solution eliminates
the good as well as the bad that results from the mandate. The more
reasonable approach might be to make fraudulent settlements more
easily voidable and to increase the sanction for obtaining such a settlement.
Still another recurring rationale for the notice requirement is that
it tends to prevent stale claims. 8 This rationale implies more than the
policy of repose since it also encompasses knowing waiver, trumped-up
claims, bad faith concealment and destruction of evidence. Much of the
difficulty in implementing this policy of the notice requirement, however,
ever possible because they are a means of amicably resolving doubts and un-
certainties and preventing lawsuits.
D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Loflin, 440 F.2d 1213, 1215 (5th Cir. 1971).
51. Two of the most notable provisions of article two that encourage compromise
are §§ 2-508 (cure) and 2-609 (right to assurance on prospective failure of perform-
ance). The various notice provisions, §§ 2-602(1) and 2-605(1) (rejection), 2-607(3)
and (5) (notice of breach and vouching-in), 2-608(2) (revocation of acceptance) and
2-706(3) and (4) (resale) serve this purpose. See also UNIFORM Co mE clAL CODE §§
1-107 (written waiver of breach without consideration); 2-614 (substituted perform-
ance) ; 2-615 (excuse). The general obligation of good faith imposed by § 1-203 should
require the parties upon breach to negotiate cooperatively and to minimize damages.
52. 6 A. CORmIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAcTs § 1292 (1962).
53. Texas Motorcoaches, Inc. v. A.C.F. Motors Co., 154 F.2d 91, 94-95 (3rd Cir.
1946) ; Smith v. Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 103, 122 So. 2d 591, 593 (1960) ;
L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 467, 438 S.W.2d 717, 720 (1969);
Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 235, 122 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1963).
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relates to the problem of determining when a defect should have become
apparent. This determination cannot always be based on the date of
injury, for in many instances there is also a question of when the
claimant should reasonably have associated the injury with a defect in the
goods.
The problem is aptly illustrated by Murphy v. Gilchrist Co.,54
where the plaintiff based his cause of action on a rash which he received
from wearing pajamas purchased from the defendant. The court held that
the claim was barred as a matter of law because of the plaintiff's un-
reasonable delay in giving notice. The facts established that notice of
breach was given 40 days after the rash began, 34 days after the claimant
consulted a doctor about the rash and 27 days after the doctor advised
the claimant that the rash was attributable to a "local" rather than
to a blood condition. The court seemed undoubtedly to have been
influenced by the plaintiff's own testimony that "from the beginning"
he thought the rash was caused by the pajamas.5" This case stands in
sharp contrast to Davidson v. Wee,"8 where the court held that a delay
of approximately two months in giving notice of injury was not untimely
as a matter of law where the plaintiff was required to seek medical
advice to determine the nature and extent of his injury.
THE CASE AGAINST NOTICE
Professor James suggests that in personal injury cases the notice
requirement "may prove a trap to the unway victim who will generally
not be steeped in the 'business practice' which justifies the rule." He
therefore concludes that there is "much to be said" for the New York
rule which limits the requirement to actions for business loss." Dean
Prosser picks up this "business practice" rationale in his handbook
on torts and elaborates on its restrictions by arguing that "as applied
to personal injuries, and notice to a remote seller, it becomes a booby-
trap for the unwary."58
There is no basis, however, for concluding that the usefulness of the
notice requirement applies only to suits involving claims for pecuniary
54. 310 Mass. 635, 39 N.E.2d 427 (1942).
55. Id. at 636, 39 N.E.2d at 428.
56. 93 Ariz. 191, 379 P.2d 744 (1963).
57. James, Products Liability, supra note 20, at 197.
58. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 655. James' "business-practice" rationale and Pros-
ser's "booby-trap" phrase were picked up by the court in the much cited case of Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700, 377 P.2d
897, 900 (1962), and have been widely applied subsequently by other courts in dispens-
ing with the notice requirement.
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loss. The foregoing discussion has hopefully demonstrated that the notice
requirement serves several purposes in any action for breach involving
the sale of goods-though the degree of usefulness may be difficult to
measure and may differ with each case.59 Criticism of the notice require-
ment, therefore, must be directed not to its lack of usefulness but rather
to its oppressiveness on the claimant. In determining this oppressiveness,
there are three recurrent factors that can be isolated in the criticism:
the nature of the injury, the absence of privity and the lack of knowledge-
ableness on the part of the claimant.
THE NATURE OF THE INJURY
The primary distinction that personal injury claims may possess,
for purposes of determining the propriety of requiring notice of breach,
is that the claimant may be incapacitated by the injury and, therefore,
unable to give early notice. The cases consistently recognize such in-
capacity as a valid excuse for delayed notice.6"
Questions inevitably arise at the outer borders of the concept of
capacity, as where the claimant is deceased, is a minor or where an
agency relationship exists between an incapacitated claimant and another
who knows of the claim but is not incapacitated. If the claimant dies
before he can be expected to give notice, the duty to give notice pre-
sumably devolves upon his executor or administrator. The issue is less
clear, however, in the case of an incompetent minor.61 And although the
59. UNIFORM. ComAmcrAI. CODE § 2-607, Comment 4, states that the notice require-
ment of § 2-607(3) (a) is "designed to defeat commercial bad faith." It is, nevertheless,
clear from this and the succeeding comment that the notice requirement is intended to
apply to consumer claims for personal injuries. The term "commercial" in comment 4
may perhaps be used in its generic sense as referring merely to sales. Alternatively,
since the immediately preceding discussion in comment 4 deals with the stricter standard
for notice applicable to the "merchant buyer," the term may be used here to imply that
the primary (although not the only) purpose of the notice requirement is to prevent
price chiseling of the sort described by Professor Honnold. The "commercial bad
faith" referred to in comment 4 must be compared with the statement in comment 5 that
even the consumer claiming damages for personal injury under § 2-318 "can be properly
held to the use of good faith in notifying, once he has had time to become aware of the
legal situation."
60. See, e.g., Bonker v. Ingersoll Products Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955);
Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948) ; Downey v. Mahoney, 25 Mass.
App. 196 (1962).
61. In Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), the court indicated
its unwillingness to bar a minor plaintiff's claim on account of her parents' delay in
giving notice of breach: "The law peculiarly favors minors, and delay on the part of
her parents or others could not be used to her prejudice." Id. at 83. See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 488(1) (1965):
A child who suffers physical harm is not barred from recovery by the negli-
gence of his parent, either in the parent's custody of the child or otherwise.
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agency concept has been used to overcome problems of privity, 2 it may
be questionable to reverse the process by imposing a duty on the claimant's
agent to give notice on behalf of his principal since the agent may not
have the same interests in asserting the claim as does the principal.63
Conversely, however, it seems clear that notice from whatever
source should satisfy the requirement provided the notice is otherwise
sufficient.64 There is no particular value in requiring the claimant
himself to give notice as long as the seller is alerted to the claim so
that he can take whatever measures he would normally take upon
receiving such information.
In most instances the amount of damages claimed from personal
injuries is probably substantially greater than the value of the allegedly
defective product that caused the injuries. It would not seem to follow,
however, that the consumer claiming personal injuries is any less likely
to give notice of breach because of the relative or absolute smallness of the
product's value. Even though the injured consumer may have no motiva-
tion to recover the value of the product, he is motivated to recover for his
personal injuries. He may be expected to complain because he feels
unjustly injured and wants redress rather than because of the nature
of the injury suffered.
ABSENCE OF PRIVITY
Prosser argues that "at least until he has had legal advice it will
not occur to [the injured consumer] to give notice to one with
whom he has had no dealings."65 Presumably this criticism would
apply with equal force if the consumer suffers personal injuries, physical
damage to property or pecuniary loss.
Absence of privity may take two forms. One involves a claim by a
buyer against a remote seller of the product while the other involves a
claim by a nonpurchasing user, consumer or bystander against any
seller in the distributive chain. The situations are similar in that in
62. See, e.g., Pendarvis v. General Motors Corp., 6 UCC REP. SERv. 457 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1969), holding that the husband of a wife-purchaser may sue the seller for in-juries either as a beneficiary under Code § 2-318 or because the wife purchased the al-
legedly defective product as agent for her husband as undisclosed principal.
63. But see Owen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 273 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1959), where
the court in holding plaintiff's claim barred by lack of timely notice was obviously im-
pressed by the fact that plaintiff's wife was an employee at defendant's store when the
injury occurred.
64. In Bonker v. Ingersoll Products Corp., 132 F. Supp. 5 (D. Mass. 1955), one
of the grounds for holding that the plaintiff had met the notice requirement was that the
plaintiff's mother notified the defendant store of the alleged breach immediately after
the plaintiff was allegedly injured by the defendant's product.
65. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 655.
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neither instance has the claimant dealt with the seller personally, but the
problem of notice presented by each situation may differ.
There is very little discussion in the case law regarding the duty of
a buyer to give notice of breach to a remote seller as a condition precedent
to his right to sue that seller. In Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,"
the court indicated that timely notice to the immediate seller is sufficient
to enable a buyer to sue a remote seller. In San Antonio v. Warwick
Club Ginger Ale Co.,67 on the other hand, the court dismissed a claim
against an immediate seller for lack of timely notice and failed to consider
whether the buyer's earlier notice to the remote manufacturer was suf-
ficient against the immediate seller.
It is perhaps more reasonable to treat notice to an immediate seller
as sufficient against a remote seller than vice-versa, in view of the
immediacy of relation that exists in the one instance but not in the other.
It is also probably in accord with human nature to expect the injured
purchaser to give notice of breach to his immediate seller. The buyer
normally looks to that seller for repairs or other adjustment. If he
has not yet paid the full purchase price, the purchaser may expect a
reduction in his cost because of the breach. Even where such factors are
absent, an ownership interest in the buyer still exists which may be
sufficient to justify an expectation that he will complain to the seller with
whom he has dealt. Such psychological motivations, however, may be
absent as between a buyer and a remote seller.
Nevertheless, a special situation exists whenever the buyer relies
upon express warranties or public advertisements from a remote seller
as the basis for his claim. In this situation the buyer admits both know-
ledge of the seller's identity and either that he relied upon such repre-
sentations or that they formed a part of the basis of his bargain in the
purchase of the goods. It seems reasonable in such a situation to expect
the buyer to give notice of the breach to one whose representations
induced him to buy, particularly where the incorrectness of those repre-
sentations forms the basis of the claim for breach. If the reasonableness
of requiring notice to a remote seller turns upon whether the buyer
could fairly be expected to know that seller's identity, the problem is
resolved in most cases by the fact that the name of the remote seller is
contained either on the product itself or on the container of the product.
In addition, the immediate seller should generally be able to furnish the
remote seller's name on request.
66. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
67. 104 R.I. 700, 248 A.2d 778 (1968).
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A rule that notice to the immediate seller should be deemed suf-
ficient to enable the buyer to sue a remote seller might rest on the
assumption that the immediate seller could be expected to notify his own
supplier."8 This assumption may not always prove sound, however. If
the immediate seller fails to notify the remote seller, the latter would be
prejudiced by his remote status vis-a-vis the claimant. An action by
the remote seller against his own buyer for damages resulting from
failure to give him notice of the breach could be an inadequate remedy
since in many instances the remote seller would be unable to prove that
such delayed notice was a substantial cause of his liability.
In many situations the propriety of requiring the buyer to give
notice to a remote seller may turn upon the buyer's knowledgeableness,
the presence or absence of warranties and advertisements by the remote
seller or upon other factors indicating whether the buyer could reasonably
be expected to give such notice. In any event, half a loaf is better than
none. Absence of privity is certainly no excuse for lack of notice where
privity exists and, therefore, this excuse should not be used as a justifica-
tion for dispensing with the notice requirement in most personal injury
claims.
The problems inherent in requiring notice of breach by the non-
purchasing claimant are substantially the same as those involved in
requiring the purchaser to give notice to a remote seller. The basic
difference is that the nonpurchaser lacks any ownership interest in the
goods. How much the absence of an ownership interest should affect a
determination of the reasonableness of requiring prompt notice of breach
will depend on the facts of the particular case. There are many non-
purchasing claimants, such as members of the purchaser's immediate
family, whose interest in the goods may be substantially identical with
that of the purchaser himself. To the extent that the reasonableness of
the notice requirement is deemed to turn upon such factors as the
knowledgeableness of the claimant and the ease of determining the
seller's identity, absence of an ownership interest should not be controlling.
LACK OF KNOWLEDGEABLENESS ON THE PART OF THE CLAIMANT
Probably the main criticism of the notice requirement goes to the
claimant's assumed lack of knowledgeableness. He is the "lay consumer,"
who is unversed in the complicated ways of commercial law and accord-
ingly should not be expected to conform to those ways. This argument,
68. Cf. the "vouching-in" procedure of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(5) (a).
This procedure, however, is not a substitute for the notice requirement of § 2-607(3) (a).
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of course, has no peculiar application to personal injury claims. Such an
Argument does have substantial appeal, particularly at a time when con-
sumer interests are the focus of a belated but justified public concern.
The appeal, however, runs the risk both of overstatement and of dis-
regarding the countervailing interests that justify the notice requirement.
The lay consumer's lack of knowledgeableness relates only to the
degree of such knowledgeableness based on the particular facts of each
case and, therefore, does not indicate that notice should be dispensed with
as a matter of law whenever personal injuries are involved or privity is
absent. As the Alabama Supreme Court has said in Smith v. Pizitz of
Bessemer, lit. :69
[I]t may well be that the retail purchaser, the victim of
personal injury, is too unlearned in the ways of commerce to
be held to the same standards as the experienced merchant.
If so, this consideration properly goes, in our opinion, to the
question of what is a reasonable time for notice to be given on
the facts of the particular case. °
The comments to the Uniform Commercial Code apparently agree with
this conclusion since they recognize that a more relaxed standard of what
constitutes a "reasonable time" for notice is applicable to the lay con-
sumer.
7 1
Allowing a "lack of knowledge" defense leaves open the possibility
that any claimant who can make the slightest pretense of being a "lay
consumer" may plead lack of knowledge of his duty to give timely
notice. But such a plea can be balanced against all the facts of the
particular case and need not be taken at face value where the circum-
stances point to a contrary conclusion. Products liability is a relatively
new and rapidly changing field of the law. It is entirely conceivable that
in a case like Pritchard the claimant might not recognize his cause
69. 271 Ala. 101, 122 So. 2d 591 (1960).
70. Id. at 103, 122 So. 2d at 593.
71. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607, Comment 4, provides in pertinent part:
The time of notification is to be determined by applying commercial standards
to a merchant buyer. "A reasonable time" for notification from a retail con-
sumer is to be judged by different standards so that in his case it will be ex-
tended, for the rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial
bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy.
Comment 5 to the same section, dealing with the duty of the § 2-318 beneficiary to give
notice, states:
What is said above, with regard to the extended time for reasonable notifica-
tion from the lay consumer after the injury is also applicable here; but even a
beneficiary can be properly held to the use of good faith in notifying, once he
has had time to become aware of the legal situation.
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of action until he consults a lawyer. But such claims are probably
atypical of the majority of products liability suits in which a potential
claimant would normally suspect defectiveness when damage occurs.
Moreover, one should not discount the power of the law as an
educational device. If notice is required in sales cases, people will become
aware of the requirement. How widespread this awareness will become
depends upon the effort made to educate the public. It is helpful if man's
proclivities accord with his education. The primary consideration, how-
ever, is to determine that the educational goal is desirable. Once this
determination is made, other problems should be classified not as objec-
tions to the goal but as difficulties to be met in the educational process.
The extent to which the claimant may reasonably be expected to
give notice of breach is directly related to the degree of specificity
required of such notice. It has been stated that notice of breach must
fairly advise the seller of the alleged defect, must refer to the particular
sale so far as is practicable and must "assert, directly or by reasonable
inference, that the buyer is claiming a violation of his legal rights,
although it need not take the form of an express claim for damages or
threat of such." 2
A substantial portion of the litigation on the issue of sufficiency of
notice concerns the question of what constitutes an assertion "directly or
by reasonable inference" that the buyer is claiming a violation of his
legal rights.7 Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co. 4 is fairly illustrative
of the problem. In that case the claimant suffered injuries as the result of
an accident which occurred when a new tire blew out while the plaintiff
was driving on vacation. On the day of the accident the buyer called his
seller and said: "Herb, what kind of tires did you sell me? . . . We
had a blowout and a terrible accident resulted from it."75 The Wisconsin
72. Nashua River Paper Co. v. Lindsay, 249 Mass. 365, 370, 144 N.E. 224, 225
(1924). In Nugent v. Popular Markets, Inc., 353 Mass. 45, 228 N.E.2d 91 (1967), the
court held that notice is sufficient if it includes the claimant's name and address, the
nature of the injury and claimant's intent to claim damages.
73. See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, § 19.05[21 ; cases cited in Annot., 53
A.L.R.2d 270 (1957). Compare Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 837, 314 P.2d 130
(1957) (oral complaint and exhibit of rash to seller held insufficient notice) ; Idzykowski
v. Jordan Marsh Co., 279 Mass. 163, 166, 181 N.E. 172, 173 (1932) (telling seller how
product injured buyer's hands "so other people would be careful" held insufficient)
with McAnulty v. Lema, 200 Cal. App. 2d 126, 19 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1962) (whether buyer's
generalized expressions of discontent to the seller constituted sufficient notice of breach
held to be a question for the jury) ; Clarizo v. Spada Distrib. Co., 231 Ore. 516, 373 P.2d
689 (1962) (buyer's flat rejection of seller's offer to reduce price of goods claimed to be
defective held to be sufficient notice of breach).
74. 19 Wis. 2d 224, 122 N.W.2d 737 (1963).
75. Id. at 235, 120 N.W.2d at 53 (1963).
476
NOTICE OF BREACH IN SALES
Supreme Court initially held that the notice was insufficient as a matter
of law since it failed to apprise the seller that the buyer was asserting a
legal claim for damages. The court then reversed itself on rehearing,
holding that the issue of sufficiency presented a question for the fact finder.
The lay consumer can hardly be expected to assert his claim in
legal terms, nor can he necessarily be expected to assert that he even thinks
he has a legal claim against the seller. The comments to § 2-607 of the
Code state that the purpose of notice is only "to let the seller know
that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched." 6 All
that is essentially needed of the claimant is that he complain and not
that he threaten suit. In many instances the nature of the defect may not
be manifest to the claimant when he does complain, and in such a
situation the most that can reasonably be expected of him is a state-
ment that the product is troublesome." It seems inappropriate to expect
the claimant both to voice his dissatisfaction at the earliest possible date
and to assert his rights at that time as fully as he might normally do after
the nature of the defect has become manifest. The main objective of
notice is to let the seller know that the buyer is experiencing trouble with
the product. Once such notice has been given, the obligation to obtain
further information may then reasonably be placed on the seller.
PROOF OF NOTICE
Where proof of notice is required, the consensus is that the burden
both of pleading and of proving timely notice or excuse for its absence
rests on the claimant."' However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which are substantially followed in many states, place the burden on the
defendant to plead laches as an affirmative defense." Failure to give
timely notice arguably constitutes laches within the meaning of these
76. UMFO1M COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607, Comment 4.
77. Compare Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Sunde, 19 Wis. 2d 129, 119 N.W.2d 321 (1963)
(seller's knowledge that buyer was having trouble with the goods and was trying to have
them repaired held insufficient to constitute notice of breach) with Lewis v. Mobil Corp.,
8 UCC REP'. SERv. 625 (8th Cir. 1971) (seller's knowledge that buyer was having trouble
with the goods held sufficient to satisfy notice requirement).
78. Owen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 273 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1959) ; L.A. Green Seed
Co. v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 438 S.W.2d 717 (1969); Avant Garde, Inc. v. Armtex,
Inc., 4 UCC RE1,. SERv. 949 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Holowka v. York Farm Bureau
Co-Op. Ass'n, 2 UCC REP SERv. 445 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
79. "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively .. .
laches . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is suffi-
cient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have
occurred. A denial of performance or occcurrence shall be made specifically
and with particularity.
FFD. R. Cirv. P. 9(c).
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rules.8" Laches, however, is normally treated as an equitable defense while
proof of notice, when required, is often held to be a question for the jury.
But even if the burden of pleading laches rests on the defendant, it does
not follow that the burden of proof should also be placed upon him."' The
policy which dictates that the burden of proof be placed on the party
more likely to have knowledge of the facts would suggest that this
burden be placed on the claimant.
Some cases indicate that the question of notice does not present an
issue for the jury if there is no indication that the seller was prejudiced
by lack of notice.82 Such an approach seems questionable, since proof of
prejudice may often be impossible. There may be no way of showing that
the seller would have been benefited by early investigation and efforts
toward settlement. In addition, establishing that the buyer was free of
bad faith or waiver of his rights in not giving early notice may be
impossible. In view of the nature of the policies that favor giving notice,
prejudice should be assumed and the burden of persuasion as to timeli-
ness of notice or as to excuse for its absence should rest on the claimant
throughout the case.
The rubric for establishing whether the issue of notice presents a
question of law or of fact is the same as that generally applied-whether
reasonable men could differ as to the proper inferences to be drawn
from the facts taken in the light most favorable to the claimant.8" Many
cases resolve the issue of notice against the claimant as a matter of law.
Perhaps such treatment of the issue is the real "booby-trap for the
unwary." The considerations are far too complicated to justify such
treatment, at least where the lay consumer is involved. Where excuse
for failure to give notice rests solely on the assertion of the lay claimant
that he was unaware of his duty in this regard, the fact finder must still
determine the complicated issue of whether such an assertion is bona fide.
Notice, though it may well be a desideratum in sales cases, frequently
constitutes a relatively minor element in the total context of a case.
Many other factors must be weighed along with notice. Thus, if the
80. Failure to give timely notice of breach under the Uniform Sales Act was de-
scribed as giving rise to a defense of "laches" in Kull v. General Motors Co., 311 Pa.
580, 166 A. 562 (1933).
81. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 673 (1954) ; James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV.
51, 59-60 (1961).
82. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 299 (3d
Cir. 1961) ; Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 67-68, 207 A.2d 305, 313
(1965). See also Shanker, supra note 5.
83. Columbia Axle Co. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 63 F.2d 206, 208 (6th Cir.
1933) ; San Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co., 104 R.I. 700, 708, 248 A.2d 778,
782 (1968) ; WILLISTON, supra note 35, § 484a.
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claimant is asserting a trumped-up claim, it will normally take many
factors other than an inadequately explained failure to give notice to
establish this fact. Moreover, where proof of liability is otherwise strong,
the quantum of evidence necessary to establish timely notice or excuse
for its absence should be correspondingly diminished.
Courts seemingly tend to resolve issues as a matter of law in those
contexts where they are not in sympathy with the policy of the law. Lack
of sympathy should hardly obtain, however, where the issue is the time-
liness or sufficiency of notice or the adequacy of excuse for not giving
notice. Such issues, when viewed in the overall context of the case, seem
more akin to contributory negligence, which is generally left to the
jury."' It seems inappropriate for the courts to exclude all evidence on
the issue of notice. If there is any issue that a jury can be expected to
handle effectively, it is the issue of bad faith or fraud. Even where
evidence of bad faith is absent, the jury should be entitled to weigh the
issue of notice as a defense similar to laches. It hardly seems reasonable
to exclude such evidence because of the possibility that the jury may
give it either a greater or a lesser weight than it deserves. Once it is
conceded that the notice issue is relevant, evidence on the issue should
be admitted so that it can be weighed with all the other relevant facts
and circumstances in the case.
CONCLUSION
The current trend toward dispensing with the notice requirement
in products liability cases is probably attributable to disaffection with
the "niceties of sales law.""5 But the realities of sales practice indicate
that the notice requirement serves useful purposes and is not unreasonably
burdensome in any single category of cases. The most appealing cases
for consistently dispensing with the requirement involve claims against
a seller with whom the claimant is not in privity. But even then the
claimant may know the remote seller's identity, and, therefore, it may be
reasonable to expect him to give notice. Lack of prejudice from failure to
give notice should not be assumed, since such an assumption under-
84. F. HARPER & F. JAIiES, TORTS 1207 (1956) ; PROSSER, supra note 17, at 418.
Although Code § 2-607(3) (a) states that the buyer "muste give notice within a reason-
able time after breach is or should have been discovered, the standard for determining
reasonableness is quite flexible. "What is a reasonable time for taking any action de-
pends on the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-204(2).
85. Cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1962) : "The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be
made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales."
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estimates the beneficial policies served by the notice requirement. More-
over, to dispense completely with the notice requirement runs afoul of
the statutory intent expressed in Code § 2-607 (3) (a).
On the other hand, a directed verdict against the lay claimant
for failure to give timely notice or to offer adequate excuse for such
failure should be uncommon. The unsophisticated claimant may not
know that he is expected to give notice of breach. Determination of such
a claimant's bona fides should normally be left to the fact finder.
